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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The East Asia region has been the envy of developing countries for most of the postwar period.
Striking economic growth helped rapidly push the region up the development ladder to join the
elite group of high-income countries. Many economists have speculated as to the reasons for this
East Asian miracle. The superior accumulation of physical and human capital has been considered
by many to be an important factor contributing to their success. However, considerable debate still
exists as to whether export-promoting policies, which many Asian countries implemented, were an-
other key driving force behind the Asian miracle. Some researchers judge that governments shaped
the course of development (for example, Sachs and Warner, 1995), whereas others discount the role
of government trade policies in the development process (for example, Patrick and Rosovsky, 1976;
Rodríguez and Rodrik, 2000). Understanding the extent to which policy instruments contributed
to rapid growth in East Asia is essential for other developing countries attempting to get their
policy fundamentals right.
Many cross-country studies have investigated the relationship between trade policies and eco-
nomic growth (see Baldwin, 2003, for a recent survey). There is, however, a major identiﬁcation
problem in separating the eﬀects of outward-orientated trade policies and sensible macroeconomic
policies in the analysis (argued in Rodríguez and Rodrik, 2000; Srinivasan and Bhagwati, 2001).
Outward-oriented economies have often implemented macroeconomic stabilization programs, such
as setting realistic exchange rates and maintaining moderate ﬁscal deﬁcits. The lack of observable
controls makes it diﬃcult to distinguish the eﬀects of trade policies from those of macro policies.
Furthermore, after taking account of the diversity of countries and the various forms of trade policies
implemented by them, it is diﬃcult to serve a consistent cross-country relationship between trade
policies and economic growth: there may not be enough cross-country variation fully to control for
such heterogeneity.1
In explaining their reasons for being unable to provide a rigorous policy analysis, the World
Bank (1993) discusses an alternative methodology to avoid the identiﬁcation problem that haunts
the literature:
[I]t is very diﬃcult to establish statistical links between growth and a speciﬁc interven-
tion, even more diﬃcult to establish causality. Because we cannot know what would
1Similar criticisms apply to the literature of within-country cross-industry studies, as discussed in Section 6.
2have happened in the absence of a speciﬁc policy, it is diﬃcult to test whether inter-
ventions increased growth rates. [W]e cannot oﬀer a rigorous counterfactual scenario.
(p6)
Stiglitz (2001) recently made a similar point in concluding the volume entitled Rethinking the
East Asian Miracle:
[T]he problem of interpreting the [Asian] miracle, crisis, and recovery is that we have
an underidentiﬁed system: we do not have the controlled experiments that would allow
us to assess what would have happened. (p522)
The paper presents an estimation framework that conducts such counterfactual exercises to
assess the role of trade policy in growth. Although there seems no obvious opportunity to conduct
controlled experiments on trade policy, we can still perform counterfactual exercises by following
two steps: ﬁrst use observed data along with an economic model to recover estimated parameters
of underlying economic primitives that are invariant to policy environment. In this application,
I estimate the parameters of ﬁrm cost functions. The second step involves using the model to
simulate changes in equilibrium outcomes resulting from changes in the underlying trade policy
(export subsidy in this case). For this simulation approach to be successful, the model used for the
exercise must closely approximate the economic environment under study, and the trade policy of
interest must be exogenous to the environment. To my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study using the
framework suggested above to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of outward-oriented policy in contributing
to the Asian miracle.
More speciﬁcally, this paper focuses on the Japanese steel industry in the 1950s and 1960s. The
Japanese steel industry is an ideal case for examining the eﬀects of export subsidies: after World
War II, the steel industry experienced unprecedented growth in production, climbing from less than
a fraction of 1 percent of the world market in 1946 to 17 percent in 1973. The industry was also the
object of a highly visible export subsidy policy, in place from 1955 to 1964. This paper analyzes
the extent to which this export policy may have accounted for steel industry growth. This is a ﬁrst
step in investigating whether government export interventions contribute to economic growth in
general, and future studies will measure the eﬀects of inter-industry externalities on such growth.
The Japanese steel industry experienced dramatic changes after the devastation of the Second
World War, when more than 70 percent of blast furnaces were out of operation due to the aftermath
3of bombardment and the lack of foreign exchange for raw material purchase. Shortly after the war,
the government designated steel as a priority sector. The most conspicuous policy in the 1950s and
1960s was the implementation of an export subsidy, which came into eﬀect in 1953. The subsidy
rate was originally set at 3 percent of a ﬁrm’s export revenue. After occasional revisions, the
subsidy was eventually phased out in 1965 (see Figure 1). The same subsidy system was applied to
all Japanese exporting sectors during the period, and appeared to be instated independent of the
interests of the steel industry. Interestingly, however, the period of subsidy provision coincides with
a period of remarkable growth in the industry, and the steel industry expanded production more
than fourfold between 1953 and 1964. This not only met rapidly growing domestic demand but
also stimulated steel exports, which grew at over 20 percent annually, raising Japan to the status
of the world’s largest steel exporter in 1969.
Industry circles have recognized that producing steel involves substantial learning in production.
Given experience of repetitive tasks, steel workers are likely to learn from cumulative experience how
such tasks can be done more quickly and eﬃciently. If such “learning by doing” is indeed integral
to steel production, the export subsidy, even though it was only 4.5 percent at its highest, could in
principle have made a large diﬀerence to the evolution of the Japanese steel industry. The question
is how important this eﬀect was. The paper estimates the magnitudes of the eﬀect of learning
by doing and inter-ﬁrm knowledge spillover on growth within the industry. These estimates are
based on a dynamic model of production technology that incorporates the importance of learning
by doing. The paper then runs the model to analyze the impact of the export subsidy using the
obtained estimates.
This paper contributes to both the literature on the evaluation of trade policy, and the liter-
ature on the estimation of learning by doing. Irwin and Pavcnik (2001) examine recent aspects
of the Airbus-Boeing rivalry to study the eﬀects of subsidy, the policy implications of which were
ﬁrst studied by Brander and Spencer (1985). Their study lacks, however, any analysis of learning
in the aircraft industry. Though the international steel market appeared to have been perfectly
competitive during my study period, the export subsidy must have usefully helped boost cost com-
petitiveness because of the concurrent presence of learning by doing. A handful of case studies have
evaluated the performance of tariﬀ protection policies in the presence of learning by doing. These
papers either use calibration (Baldwin and Krugman, 1988; Miravete, 1998), or static estimation
with the assumption of complete knowledge spillovers (Head, 1994). It is well known that the
4magnitude of the subsidy eﬀect diﬀers with the degree of spillover (Spence, 1984). In particular,
complete spillover generates the maximum policy impact given the same subsidy rate. It is thus
desirable to estimate the spillover parameter to obtain an accurate measure of policy eﬀect. The
main contribution made by this paper to the above literature is to allow for the estimation of a
knowledge spillover eﬀect using a dynamic estimation framework to investigate an outward-oriented
policy. Our model also considers import tariﬀs in the assessment of export subsidies.
This study also contributes to a small but growing body of work on the estimation of internal
and external learning eﬀects, on which the literature to date has oﬀered a variety of evidence across
industries.2 Some papers estimate a production function and ﬁnd strong learning eﬀects but small
spillover (Thornton and Thompson, 2001, for wartime shipbuilding), while others estimate a cost
function and ﬁnd strong internal and external spillovers (Zimmerman, 1982, for the construction
of nuclear power plants; Irwin and Klenow, 1994, for the production of dynamic random access
memories; Gruber, 1998, for erasable programmable read-only memories). Among the cited papers,
only Irwin and Klenow (1994) models the intertemporal decision making of a ﬁrm. The present
paper also considers such a decision problem, but unlike Irwin and Klenow (1994), the model
employed explicitly incorporates international trade, and evaluates policy eﬀectiveness by using
simulations.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives an overview of the Japanese steel industry in
the post-war period along with a discussion of the government policies then in place in the market.
This section ﬁnds that providing an export subsidy was the most visible and seemingly eﬀective
policy instrument of the period. It also emphasizes the importance of learning by doing in the
steel-producing process. Section 3 outlines a model, and introduces an estimation framework on
the supply side of the steel industry. Section 4 presents estimation results and their interpretations,
and also oﬀers several speciﬁcation tests to check the sensitivity of the results. Section5 analyzes the
results of the simulation exercises used to measure the eﬀects of the subsidy policy on the evolution
of the industry. This section also analyzes policy impacts under a diﬀerent subsidy structure, and a
diﬀerent degree of cross-ﬁrm knowledge spillover. Section 6 contains the study’s conclusions. Data
and technical appendices follow.
The paper presents signiﬁcant evidence of a learning rate exceeding 20 percent per year in the
2“Internal learning” is the learning by doing eﬀect that happens within a ﬁrm, while “external learning” is the
knowledge spillover eﬀect across ﬁrms.
5Japanese steel industry in 1955-1965. It ﬁnds only a small intra-industry spillover eﬀect, which may
reﬂect the nature of the Japanese labor market at that time. The simulation exercises demonstrate
that the subsidy provided by the government until 1964 contributed only minimally, accounting
for an average of just 2 percent of the output increase in 1955-1968. The eﬀect of the subsidy
would have been much larger if ﬁrms had shared their experience with one another: a subsidy can
alleviate the free rider problem. The paper ﬁnds that the impact of the subsidy policy critically
depends on the slope of a dynamic supply curve.
2 An Overview of the Japanese Steel Market
Japan’s miraculous growth from the 1950s through the 1970s has been closely studied by economists
and policy makers. Japan’s experience has been taken as a prototype of the so-called “ﬂying goose
model” inwhichindustries experience rapidgrowthone after another, witha leadindustry providing
external beneﬁts to subsequent industries that help them take oﬀ. In this context, the steel industry
was the “lead goose” in Japan’s marvelous growth after the Second World War, followed by the
TV and automobile industries.
This section provides an historical overview of the Japanese steel market. Beginning with
a description of government policies aﬀecting the steel industry during the post-war period, the
section goes on to explain some unique aspects of steel production in Japan. “Learning by doing”
appears to be important in steel production. The nature of human capital accumulation along with
the unique labor market practices in Japan may, however, have prevented steel ﬁrms from sharing
their experience with one another.
2.1 Government Interventions in the Post-war Era
The Japanese steel industry faced many challenges in the early post-war era. The industry had lost
its traditional sources of raw materials in Northeastern Asia (Manchuria), and did not have enough
foreign exchange to purchase raw materials elsewhere. As a consequence, 70 percent of the blast
furnaces in Japan ceased operations in 1946. Steel production dropped to just over 0.5 million tons
in 1946 from a wartime peak of 7.5 million tons just three years earlier.
The Japanese government decided to implement policies to revive the steel industry as quickly
6as possible.3 The ﬁrst policy was a rationalization program. It involved concessional loans to the
industry and rearrangements of payment schedules for previous government loans. The government
also gave steel ﬁrms preferential tax treatment, including lower property taxes and accelerated
depreciation rates. Foreign exchange loans were provided to help their purchase of raw materials.
As a result, by 1955 steel production was restored to its war time peak (see Figure 1). At this
point, all government interventions were essentially replaced by import tariﬀs and export subsidies.
Japan had an import tariﬀ of 15 percent on steel until 1967 when it agreed to drop the rate
to 12 percent at the Kennedy Round of GATT. Until that point, the tariﬀ system had remained
unaltered since its inception, with the exception of six months in 1957 (April - October) when the
tariﬀ was temporarily interrupted in response to a surge in demand that accompanied an economic
boom. While the import tariﬀ doubtless protected domestic steel makers from direct competition
with foreign steels, it may have had little to do with the increase in Japanese steel production shown
in Figure 1, because of the fact that Japan also exported steels during the period. We discuss how
the import tariﬀ comes into play in our estimation model in Section 3.1.
The most visible government policy that seems to have had great impact on the industry in
the 1950s and 1960s was the export subsidy provided by the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI). The trade journal published by Japan Iron and Steel Federation (1969) also
acknowledged that the policy had greatly beneﬁtted the industry. The marginal rate of subsidy on
the average ﬁrm is illustrated in Figure 1.4 The subsidy came into eﬀect in 1953 and was based
on a ﬁrm’s annual export revenue, the rate being originally set at 3 percent. In April 1957, the
government amended the policy to provide a 4.5 percent subsidy on export revenues exceeding
half the revenue of the previous year. This amendment was terminated in 1961, and the subsidy
itself was phased out as Japan became a member of GATT. The subsidy system was applied to all
exporting sectors including two major industries: textiles and machinery. Textiles were the largest
export when the subsidy system was introduced. Textile exports, however, dropped considerably
in the period, declining from 30 percent of total Japanese exports in 1955 to 15 percent in 1963.
Machinery exports, on the other hand, started taking oﬀ in the late 1960s. The coverage of various
exporting sectors should have made it diﬃcult for MITI to lobby in favor of any particular industry
3See Yamamura (1986) for a general survey of Japanese industrial policies.
4The Japanese subsidy system had two tracks, one based on export revenue and the other on export proﬁt. Each
company was assigned to a track that would cost the government the least. The subsidy of the steel industry was
based on export revenue during the period considered here (Japan Iron and Steel Exporters’ Association, 1974).
7in establishing a uniform export subsidy across all sectors.5 Our simulation exercises exploit this
aspect of the subsidy policy, namely, the fact that the policy appeared exogenous to the promotion
of the steel industry.
Interestingly, the period of the subsidy provision coincides with a time of remarkable growth
in the industry. Japanese steel production quadrupled from 1953 to 1964. This rapid production
growth was accompanied by export expansion, and Japan’s share of the world export market grew
from under 5 percent in 1955 to 9 percent in 1965. Most of Japan’s steel had been shipped to Asian
countries until the early 1960s, when an increasing proportion began to go to North America. The
steel export market was fairly competitive from 1955 to 1965, and there is little evidence that
Japanese steel makers played a signiﬁcant role in the world steel market during the period. Japan
Iron and Steel Exporters’ Association (1974) observed that the Japanese FOB steel price was not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the price in Antwerp, Belgium, the center of the world steel trade at
that time.6
We chose to study the steel industry over other sectors, because Japanese steel in the post-war
period has often been described as a great success story attributable to government interventions.
We have focused on the export subsidy over other policy interventions because the policy was likely
exogenous to the promotion of the industry. It is this aspect of the policy that helps us identify
the impact it had on the industry’s growth. Of course, one could analyze the policy’s impact on
another export sector, say, the cotton industry. It may well have been that this industry declined
much more slowly with the subsidy provision.
5Along with MITI’s export subsidies, the Bank of Japan also provided interest-rate subsidies on export credit.
Once a ﬁrm had an export order, it needed credit to ﬁnance the production and sale until it received payment from
the buyer. The bank oﬀered such credit with interest at below market rates (the diﬀerence in the rates was in the
range of 2-3 percent). The total amount of this subsidy was, however, limited and application was therefore restricted
to only a few large export orders. The export-credit subsidy was therefore likely to have had only a marginal impact
on steel exports (Miwa and Ramseyer, 2001). The paper thus does not focus on this export credit subsidy.
6One could argue that export subsidies might have been prone to abuse, because the export goods were in general
less likely to receive thorough inspection (See Panagariya, forthcoming). It is hard to argue against the possibility of
the over-invoicing of exports given poor documentation of the actual administrative procedure for MITI’s granting
the subsidies at that time. However, I believe that this moral hazard would not have been signiﬁcant, based on
comparison of ﬁgures from two diﬀerent sources. The diﬀerence between domestic steel production and shipments,
net of inventory, reveals (according to data published by MITI) that, on average, 12.8% of domestic steel should have
been exported from 1955 to 1968, a ﬁgure consistent with evidence reported in trade data (published by the Ministry
of Finance).
82.2 Learning in Steel Production
Over 70 percent of Japanese steel production in the 1950s and 1960s was accounted for by integrated
steel manufacturers.7 Six integrated steel companies controlled the major share of the market:
Yawata, Fuji, Nihon Kokan, Kawasaki, Sumitomo, and Kobe (in order of average market share).
My analysis thus focuses on these six ﬁrms.8
Integrated steelworks transform raw materials (iron ore and coking coal) into pig iron in a blast
furnace. Pig iron is then transformed into crude steel in a second furnace by removing carbon
and other elements. The prevalent technology used throughout most of our study period in this
second stage was the open-hearth furnace (referred to as OH), which blows air from the bottom
of a brick-lined steel shell through the molten pig iron. The air raises the temperature in the pig
iron and oxidizes the carbon in it. A basic oxygen furnace (referred to as BOF) was introduced in
Japan in the late 1950s and progressively replaced the OH. Though the presence of the OH was
signiﬁcant in Japan’s steel industry, the use of the BOF was increasingly popular to the point that
the share of BOF in the total steel production was over 50 percent in 1965, up from only 12 percent
in 1960 (see Lynn, 1982, for a description of the BOF adoption process in Japan).
Steel production could not be performed without skilled workers. An integral part of production
is temperature control in the blast furnace (see Itami, 1997, for details). Furnace temperature
control is now fully computerized, but in the 1950s it had to be done manually. To produce steel of
suﬃcient durability with eﬃcient energy consumption, the furnace temperature has to be adjusted
according to the qualities of the raw materials and the speciﬁc conditions of the fabrication process.
For instance, for eﬃcient steel production, the optimal furnace temperature should be higher when
there is humidity in a furnace and lower when the quality of iron ore is higher. When adjustments
were made manually, the frequency and size of the adjustments were determined by the experience
and judgment of the steelworkers. Many attempts had been made to standardize the temperature
control process by using statistical techniques, but these failed because the yields depended on
so many conditions speciﬁc to a plant (Japan Iron and Steel Association, 1965). Accumulated
knowledge and experience embodied in skilled workers hence appeared to play an important role
7The other steel-making process, electric steel production, was generally used to make stainless or other special
steels, and is not discussed here. Use of this technology has become widespread only recently, with the development
of mini-mills in which manufacturers use a combination of an electric arc furnace and continuous casting technology.
8We discuss an issue of the sample selection in Section 3.1.
9in an eﬃcient steel-production operation.9
The characteristics of steel production mentioned above suggest that experience gained in one
ﬁrm was not necessarily transferable to other ﬁrms because it was fairly speciﬁc to individual
plants. Another obstacle to sharing experience among ﬁrms was the unique Japanese job practices
of seniority and lifetime employment. These were vigorously adopted by Japanese industries across
the board shortly after World War II in order to secure the work force. Since experience was often
embodied in workers, these practices, by preventing the turnover and layoﬀ of skilled workers, would
have substantially reduced the ﬂow of experience among ﬁrms.
3 The Model and Estimation Methods
3.1 Overview of the Model
This section describes a model used to explain the Japanese steel market in 1955-1965. I begin the
section by providing an overview of the estimation model used in the paper, details of which are
described in the remainder of this section.
The estimation model considers Japan as a small country, which exports and imports in a com-
petitive world steel market: the Japanese export share of the world market was only 9 percent
at its highest, and its import share accounted for a mere 0.3 percent of world production even
without tariﬀs. A wide variety of industries consume steel as an intermediate input, ranging from
automobile production to construction and shipbuilding. It is likely that domestic and imported
steels were perceived as imperfect substitutes for each other, since their prices were substantially
diﬀerent. Section 4 reports that the standard error of the import price is four times that of domes-
tically produced steel, and with a higher mean. The feature of product diﬀerentiation generates
a downward-sloped domestic demand: demand for domestic steel decreases with price, as some of
the demand is satisﬁed instead by imported steel (see Appendix B for further discussion).
9The industry trade association appeared to recognize the existence of learning by doing in steel production. Japan
Iron and Steel Federation (1970b: hereafter JISF) documents the changes in the inputs of coking coal and labor hours
from 1955-1969. The consumption of coking coal per ton of steel production decreased from 700kg to 500kg, while
labor inputs dropped from 8 hours to just over 1 hour by the end of the period, a drastic eﬃciency improvement
of over 80%. Though JISF (1970b) associates the eﬃciency improvement with learning by doing, there must have
been other factors (such as technological innovations) that accounted for the increase in productivity. Section 3.2
incorporates such factors in order to identify learning eﬀects.
10A steel maker is assumed to maximize its proﬁt with respect to output under ﬁxed productive
capacity.10 The proﬁt maximization problem of each ﬁrm can be analyzed as follows (see also Figure
2; the illustration is made based on estimation results reported in Section 4 and Appendix B). At
each point in time, a ﬁrm must decide how much to sell in both the domestic and foreign markets.
Since no obvious product diﬀerentiation is observed between domestically produced steels and
exported steels, it is natural to assume that the marginal production cost of both steels is the same.
We assume that imported steel and exported steel are product diﬀerentiated and competitively
supplied in the world market. This small-economy assumption plays an important role in ensuring
that there are no terms of trade eﬀects of the export subsidy. Six ﬁrms dominated in the domestic
industry, and the degree of market power determines the slope of the domestic marginal revenue.
Firm i supplies the domestic market as long as its marginal revenue from the domestic market,
MRHi, is higher than the ﬂat marginal revenue from the competitive foreign market, MRF.A l lt h e
ﬁrms confront the same export demand. Once MRHi touches on MRF, the ﬁrm starts exporting
steel, and stops producing when the marginal cost of production, DMCi, exceeds MRF.T h ec o s t
structure is described in the next section. Firm i therefore produces steel of BD, and exports the
amount of CD in Figure 2.11
We expect MRHi to shift to the right with a rise in the imported steel price: an increase in the
tariﬀ substitutes domestic demand for some of the import demand. The fact that all the six ﬁrms
in the sample exported steel during the period indicates that the demand condition did not aﬀect
the steel output at the margin, as depicted in Figure 2. The production level is determined at D
in the ﬁgure, and a change in the import tariﬀ merely alters the allocation of domestic and foreign
shipment of domestically produced steel. Since the paper is interested in policy impacts on steel
production, but not particularly concerned about consumption shares of Japanese steel, we do not
analyze the eﬀect of the steel import tariﬀ in this paper.
Suppose the world price is Pw, and the rate of export subsidies provided by MITI is denoted by
10The paper does not look at a ﬁrm’s investment choice problem, and assumes exogenous capital stocks. If the
export subsidy accelerated a ﬁrm’s capital accumulation, the subsidy eﬀect measured in the paper is likely to be
underestimated, because the capacity size without the subsidy would have constrained the ﬁrm’s learning activity.
allowing for physical capital dynamics in addition to the learning-by-doing dynamics is beyond the scope of the paper.
11An implication of the model is that the domestic market shares should be the same across all the ﬁrms. We
cannot test this claim because of the lack of ﬁrm-level domestic shipment data (we only have ﬁrm-level production
data).
11s. The competitive foreign market makes MRF equal to Pw · (1 + s). If the elimination of export
subsidies (i.e., s =0 ) shifts the foreign marginal revenue curve to MRF∗ in Figure 2, ﬁrm i reduces
its exports from CD to EF.I fMRF∗ lies below G, however, ﬁrm i would stop exporting. It is thus
necessary to check whether each ﬁrm would still have had an incentive to export in the absence of
the subsidies. This analysis requires the estimation of MRHi derived from estimated domestic steel
demand (see Appendix B for this analysis). To anticipate the result, I found that all the ﬁrms would
have chosen to export even without the provision of the subsidies.12 For the simulation exercises
to work, s needs to be exogenous. Since the same rate was applied to all exporting sectors across
the board in Japan, MITI would not be able to lobby in favor of the steel industry. Although
it is diﬃcult to determine just how the rate was established in the policy-making process, it is
reasonable to think of the subsidy rate as exogenous to the steel makers.
As mentioned above, in the 1950s and 1960s, the six integrated steel companies that controlled
over 70 percent of the domestic market form the basis of my analysis. All the ﬁrms remained in the
market throughout my study period, and thus we do not consider the issue of ﬁrm entry and exit.
Since most learning by doing activities must have occurred in large ﬁrms, this sample selection
might have led to overstating the eﬀects of the subsidy. Section 5 reports that the eﬀect of the
export subsidy is small even without regard for this sample selection.
While the paper is concerned with the eﬀects of the export subsidy on industry growth, it would
be useful to discuss the welfare implication of the policy. In a perfectly competitive market with
no externalities, the traditional argument is against an export subsidy; in a small open economy,
no type of trade intervention can be ﬁrst best, and in a large economy, the exports should be taxed
rather than subsidized to improve the terms of trade. Subsidies to some exports may yet to be
desirable if, as a result, the terms of trade of other exports are improved (Feenstra, 1986; Itoh and
Kiyono, 1987). This is not the case with steel, however, because the subsidy was applied to all
export sectors at the same rate. In imperfect competitive markets, an export subsidy is sometimes
optimal because it raises the proﬁts of the home ﬁrm at the expense of the foreign (Brander and
Spencer, 1985). This result is, however, sensitive to assumptions as to market structure. In our
study of the steel industry subject to a competitive world environment, the export subsidy does not
have a solid rationale; even if learning by doing has externalities, a production subsidy dominates
12To save space, we do not discuss theoretical implications of ﬁrm i’s not exporting, since this situation does not
occur in the simulations.
12from the welfare point of view. While it would be interesting to analyze the deadweight welfare
loss by use of the export subsidy, rather than an optimal production subsidy, I defer this welfare
question to future research, and only focus on the eﬀect on industry growth in this paper.
The remainder of Section 3 is organized as follows. I ﬁrst model steel-production technology.
The description of the industry in the previous section reveals that learning by doing was probably
an important feature of steel production at the time. The model hence incorporates this feature,
as well as other control variables such as input prices, capacity utilization, and physical capital.
I then turn to the supply side to derive an equilibrium relationship. Particular attention is paid
to the inter-temporal decision making of ﬁrms through their own production experience. A ﬁrm’s
production decision today aﬀects its proﬁtability both now and in the future through its newly
acquired experience. The supply model is estimated in the subsequent section.
3.2 Steel-production Technology
This subsection presents a model of steel-production technology. Availability of ﬁrm-level factor
input data is limited, and so I have built a cost function incorporating four important elements of
the steel-production process: learning by doing, capacity utilization, physical capital, and material
inputs. The model allows for knowledge spillovers among steel ﬁrms. The unit of analysis is
the ﬁrm, and data are of a monthly frequency. The absence of plant-level observations in the data
prevents me from testing the existence of spillover eﬀects across plants within a single ﬁrm. Sources
and characteristics of the data set are explained in Appendix A.
Learning by doing is inherently diﬃcult to measure because it is unobservable. Following the
treatment inthe literature, I have used a cumulative output level, z, as a proxy for the ﬁrm’s learning
level. It is possible that the beneﬁt of learning is transferable across ﬁrms. I have borrowed from
Spence (1984) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988), and model the spillover process as
zi,t = θ · zIND,t+( 1− θ) · zFi,t.
This process indicates that ﬁrm i’s experience, zi, is the weighted average of the industry’s
experience, zIND,a n dﬁ r mi’s own experience, zFi. If the spillover parameter, θ, is estimated
to be zero, the experience is fully appropriated within each ﬁrm and ﬁrm i’s knowledge is not
communicable to the other ﬁrms. The spillover parameter equals one in the case of complete
13spillover. Experience in that case is fully shared by all the ﬁrms in the industry.13 Each company
accumulates its experience only by producing steel. The transition of experience by month is thus
described by zFi,t = zFi,t−1 +qi,t−1,i nw h i c hqi,t−1 is ﬁrm i’s steel output at time t−1. The initial
value of experience, zFi,0, is set to be one. In the estimation, I extended this model to allow for
knowledge depreciation to check the sensitivity of results.
This analysis does not explore the scope of international spillovers. In the 1950s and 1960s, the
U.S. occasionally sent engineers to provide technical assistance to Japanese steel makers; foreign
publications on state-of-the-art steel-production technologies were also made available in Japan.
Although it is unclear that this window onto foreign knowledge helped Japanese steel makers
increase production eﬃciency, in large part because experience was fairly ﬁrm-speciﬁc, our estimate
of learning by doing could possibly be overstated as a result of this assumption.
Also important in production costs is the degree of capacity utilization of steel-production
furnaces. The utilization rate, U, is a productivity measure deﬁned as the current output divided
by the physically available productive capacity of the furnace. It is not obvious how the utilization
rate aﬀects steel-production costs. For low utilization rates, an increase in the rate would decrease
the production cost. However, since capital is ﬁxed at any given time, at high utilization rates
diminishing returns to scale must begin to take place.
The output growth from 1955 to 65 shown in Figure 1 indicates a substantial expansion of
furnace facilities. In fact, the industry’s blast furnace capacity increased roughly at the same rate
as the steel output. The physical capacity, K, was likely to inﬂuence the cost of steel production.
Furthermore, considerable variation is observed in the rate of new capacity expansion from one ﬁrm
to another: Yawata, the largest steel maker, expanded to ﬁve times its original size by installing
more than 8 million tons of new production capacity during the ten-year period. Kobe, the smallest,
added 2 million tons to increase its capacity seven fold. Since new facilities likely embodied the
latest steel-making technology, the diﬀering pace of capacity expansion implies diﬀerent rates of
technological improvement among ﬁrms. I thus use the age of the blast furnace facility to account
for the capital depreciation in the construction of the capital variable.14 I use a depreciation rate
13While data on the patent citations count could in principle provide another way to measure spillovers, such data
do not exist in Japan, because Japan has not instituted a practice of citing other related patents.
14The age variable counts the years elapsed after the blast furnace was installed in each plant by ﬁrm. The plant-
level capacity size is used as a weight to create a ﬁrm-level index. This variable does not consider renovations. Most
renovations were made for repairs, and not to substituted for installing new facilities.










This functional form is useful in that the marginal cost has the most common learning curve
assumption, the constant elasticity version, with an additive error term, u.
It is important to control for input prices when estimating a learning rate. Otherwise the
estimated learning rate would be biased upward with decreasing input prices, even without any
learning actually taking place. The major inputs for integrated steel production were iron ore
and labor. Other essential materials, coking coal and electricity, are not included in the estimation
because both inputs were under strict government regulation and thus their prices did not ﬂuctuate
much during the period. The price of input j, wj, and a constant term are included in a Cobb-
Douglas form, ct, with the weights, γj and γ0, to be estimated, i.e., ct = γ0
￿
j (wjt)
γj.A l lﬁ r m s
are assumed to face the same input prices. The Greek letters, θ, γ0, γj, ϕ, λ,a n dφ are the supply
parameters to be estimated in the next section.
Other than the four factors described in (1), important inﬂuences on the unit cost include R&D
activity and technological innovation. Such supply shocks are captured by the term, u. I allow
this term to have ﬁrm and time-speciﬁc components (ν,a n d  respectively) in the estimation:
ui,t = νi+ t+εi,t,w h e r eε is an error. This ﬁxed-eﬀect treatment deals with eﬃciency diﬀerences
among ﬁrms that do not change over time, and industry-wide supply shocks.
While we already control for ﬁrm diﬀerences in the speed of innovation in physical capital
stocks, ε might still possibly contain unobserved technological progress. The existence of other
unobservables, such as in-house training programs for skilled workers, or advances of transportation
technologies, reinforces this concern. The endogeneity problem and its correction method are
discussed in the next section.
S i n c ei ti sd i ﬃ c u l tt oﬁ n da c c u r a t ec o s td a t at od i r e c t l ya n a l y z e( 1 ) ,Ie s t i m a t ep r i c e - c o s tm a r g i n s
by building a competition model and thereby obtain the cost parameters, as described in the next
section.
153.3 Output Choice
This subsection uses the cost model to derive an estimable equilibrium relationship. In particular, I
have constructed a steel makers’ proﬁt maximization problem and solved the ﬁrst-order condition.
The existence of learning by doing engenders a dynamic decision-making problem. In essence,
today’s decision by a ﬁrm inﬂuences tomorrow’s cost through a change in the level of accumulated
experience. A ﬁrm thus takes into account this inter-temporal link when it makes production
decisions.
It is widely believed that the success of post-war Japan was due in part to the government’s
role in tempering domestic competition through weak antitrust enforcement and legalized cartels.
In the 1950s and 1960s, MITI implemented policies to stabilize the steel price and coordinate
investments among ﬁrms in capacity expansion. This evidence itself seems to suggest that the
industry might have been in a government-led cartel. However, recent studies (Miwa, 1996; Porter,
Takeuchi, and Sakakibara, 2000) conclude that these government and industry attempts failed to
inﬂuence production or stabilize prices. This was because no penalty was imposed on defecting
ﬁrms, and thus most ﬁrms did not follow MITI’s guidance; rivalry was therefore intense in the steel
market. Based on this recent ﬁnding, we established the following supply side model: suppose that








Let TRand TC be the total revenue and cost, the latter deﬁned as (1). Firms discount future
p r o ﬁ t sa c c o r d i n gt oac o m m o nd i s c o u n tf a c t o r ,β, with a common information set. The discount
factor is set equal to 0.95.15 Total revenue is the sum of the revenues from exporting and domestic
sales.
In determining the outcome of this model, it is important to consider the appropriate equilibrium
concept. The question is whether ﬁrms take other ﬁrms’ reactions as given (open-loop strategies),
and whether they take into account the eﬀect of their own actions on others’ subsequent actions
(closed-loop strategies). With my interest in estimating the learning parameter as well as the eﬀect
of spillovers, it is diﬃcult enough to obtain a closed-loop solution of our model, let alone to estimate
15Other values of β were tried, and it was found that the objective function is fairly ﬂat in the range 0.94<β≤0.98.
Estimation is diﬃcult to converge in the range 0.98<β .
16it.16 For the sake of simplicity, I therefore use an open-loop solution in the analysis. Spence (1981)
reports that the two solution concepts give rise to similar outcomes in his example. The ﬁrst-order
condition is obtained as the following Euler equation:







where MC is the marginal cost. The marginal revenue from the foreign market, MRF,i so b -
tained from the previous section and is equal to Pw · (1 + s). This equation reﬂects the fol-
lowing inter-temporal optimization condition: today’s incremental proﬁt obtained by allocating
a unit of output from tomorrow to today equals the present value of tomorrow’s forgone proﬁt
in addition to the beneﬁt of cost reduction through learning. In order to estimate (3), I intro-
duce the projection error, ξi,t = β [EtΩi,t+1 −Ωi,t+1], to eliminate the expectation operator, where
Ωi,t+1 =( MRFt+1 −MCi,t+1)+
∂TCi,t+1
∂qi,t . This results in the following:







Note that while MCi,t contains two errors, εi,t and εi,t+1,
∂TCi,t+1
∂qi,t does not. We make the εs
explicit by using (1), and collect them to the left hand side:
ξi,t −βεi,t+1 +εi,t =
￿



















I estimate this equation by using the generalized method of moments (GMM) approach. We
use the individual ﬁxed eﬀect for νi, and use the frequency of year for the time eﬀect,  t,t o
control for industry-wide supply shocks. The moment condition is such that a set of instruments
is orthogonal to the supply shocks, εi,t and εi,t+1. The current supply shock, εi,t, would inﬂuence
not only the current endogenous variables through MCi,t, but also the future endogenous variables
through experience. The current and future series of prices and outputs may therefore not be valid
instruments.
16Benkard (2003) estimates a Markov perfect equilibrium with a model of learning by doing, however, computational
burdens force him to limit the number of ﬁrms to three, and the number of experience states to seven in the analysis.
17To correct this potential endogeneity problem, I use the one-period lagged endogenous vari-
ables, price and output, as instruments. The current supply shock should not aﬀect the variables
determined in the past. However, the lagged endogenous variables may not be exogenous if the
error has a serial correlation. I perform two statistical tests to check the validity of the instruments:
one is a standard J test (i.e., the test of overidentifying restrictions), and the other is the Durbin-
Watson test on the existence of serial correlation in the error. The next section discusses whether
both tests support the validity of using the lagged endogenous variables as instruments. The other
exogenous variables in a set of instruments, Z, are: input prices, ﬁrm age, capacity and experience
levels, and the downstream demand shifters (quarterly dummies and the index of gross production
in the transportation sector 17). The estimates were obtained by minimizing the objective function,
(Z￿η)
￿ (Z￿Z)
−1(Z η),w h e r eη is a vector of the GMM error. A t-th component of the ﬁrm i error,
ηi,t,e q u a l sξi,t + βεi,t+1 − εi,t. Standard errors of the estimates are calculated by using a delta
method.
4 Estimation Results and Sensitivity Analyses
Estimating the proposed model (5) requires data on quantities sold, prices, inputs, and cumulative
output. My data set ranges from January 1955 to December 1965. We chose to start the sample in
1955, when the steel production had recovered to the wartime peak achieved in 1943. Our estimates
of the learning eﬀects are thus based on the knowledge level newly acquired in the postwar period.
I do not use data after 1965 because at that point, over half of Japan’s steel was produced using
BOFs, a technology signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the OH. The BOF is cheaper to build, produces
steel at lower cost, and better lends itself to automation and pollution controls. The sensitivity of
the choice of the sample period is also tested below. Data sources are documented in Appendix A.
Variable deﬁnitions and summary statistics are presented in Table 1.
Several observations emerge from the information presented in Table 1. The mean value of
the domestic steel price is higher (though not statistically signiﬁcantly so) than that of the export
price, consistent with the model illustrated in Figure 2. The standard error of the import price is
substantial, four times that of the domestic price, with a higher mean. This observation motivates
17The transportation production index is highly correlated with the gross national expenditure, the production
index of shipbuilding and the gross domestic capital formation in both the public and private sectors.
18us to model product diﬀerentiation in the demand, as described in Section 3.1.
The capacity utilization rate is high, the average being over 90 percent. This is inconsistent
with the observation that the industry was overwhelmed by the severe capacity expansion race that
dominated the study period (Japan Iron and Steel Federation, 1959). The high utilization rate
revealed by the data is due to the fact that the engineering deﬁnition of “capacity” was not meant
to be the maximum available production level. The data on capacity came from companies’ semi-
annual ﬁnancial reports, which adopted a complicated conversion method endorsed by the Japanese
steel association to calculate capacity. The utilization rate in the data is thus standardized across
ﬁrms, but does not reﬂect the actual level of operational utilization in an economic sense.
The average age of the blast furnace facilities was 17 years, and over half the blast furnaces
in the sample were built after the war (33 of 59 facilities). The ownership of old facilities was
concentrated in the big three ﬁrms: Yawata, Fuji, and Nihon Kokan. The oldest blast furnace, ﬁrst
ignited in 1901, was owned by Yawata. The large variation in the age of furnace facilities leads us
to incorporate capital depreciation into the construction of the physical capital variable. We use a
depreciation rate of 5 percent in the estimation, but the resulting estimate changes little from that
of the no-depreciation case.
Regarding the estimation results of the supply equation (5), three speciﬁcations are estimated,
as shown in Table 2. Model 1 is the base estimation. I found three pieces of evidence against
the existence of serial correlation in the unobserved portion of ﬁrm productivity, after having
controlled for the ﬁrm and time ﬁxed components. First, the J statistics do not allow us to
reject the orthogonality condition between some of the instruments and the error term, ξ.T h eJ
statistics present rather indirect evidence against the presence of serial correlation, because they test
the validity of instruments conditional on there being a set of valid instruments that just identify
the model. I thus supplement the estimation with more direct tests on whether the residuals
are autocorrelated by ﬁrm. The AR(1) coeﬃcient in the table is constructed by ﬁrst obtaining
an autocorrelation coeﬃcient of the lagged residual for each ﬁrm. All the coeﬃcients are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The results in the table are an average of the coeﬃcients. Finally,
the same model is estimated by using the current, instead of lagged, endogenous variables as
instruments. The obtained estimates are similar to those reported in Model 1.
The ﬁrst two models yield precise estimates of the learning parameter. The learning rate
obtained is 24 percent, similar to values found in the literature (the learning rate is the magnitude
19of the cost drop with doubling the experience. It is calculated as 1 − 2ϕ). Ghemawat (1985), for
example, reviewed 97 academic studies from the learning-curve literature. He ﬁnds that the learning
rates for the vast majority of products (79 of 97 examined) fall in the range of 11-21 percent. Note
that the sample period starts in 1955, the year when the steel output had already exceeded the
war-time peak established in 1943. The estimated learning rate hence reﬂects the average ﬁrm’s
newly acquired knowledge over and above the knowledge stock existing before the second World
War.
Model 1 suggests that little knowledge spilled over from one steel ﬁrm to another, conﬁrming
that a ﬁrm’s production experience was fairly speciﬁc during the study period. Since much of the
steel-production knowledge was embodied in skilled labor working at speciﬁc plants, experience may
not have been easily transferable across ﬁrms. Furthermore this result is consistent with the nature
of the Japanese labor market of the time. Most Japanese companies, including steel producers,
vigorously adopted a permanent employment system, and turnover and layoﬀs were rarely observed
in Japan. This system lasted at least until the Asian economic crisis in 1997. Identifying the precise
source of this small spillover result is diﬃcult, but would be an interesting topic for future research.
The speciﬁcations include the prices of the two major inputs, iron ore and labor. The coeﬃcient
for labor is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in Model 1, but signiﬁcantly positive in other models.
While the labor cost is the average wage paid by the six ﬁrms, the measure mixes the wages of
skilled and unskilled workers. The insigniﬁcance of the labor coeﬃcient may be attributable to the
fact that skilled workers’ wages are not distinguished in our data.
The coeﬃcient for iron ore is negative, largely because an increasing number of ﬁrms preferred
to buy expensive ores of higher quality. Steel producers, who were accustomed to purchasing
inputs from neighboring countries such as the Philippines and Malaysia, began to import from
more-distant locations such as India where good-quality ores were mined. As discussed in Section
2.2, iron ores of better quality allow for more eﬃcient steel production. Though the price of ore
started to decline toward the end of the sample period owing to the advance of transportation
technology, the quality eﬀect of ore, of which we do not have an adequate measure in the data,
seems to dominate in the estimation results.
Model 1 indicates that the cost increased with the capacity utilization rate. This is not surprising
in that steel producers in general ran up against the limits of their capacities, faced with the
high steel demand during the study period. This shortage in steel supply may account for the
20positive coeﬃcient on capital. The utilization estimate satisﬁes the second-order condition to the
maximization problem (2), and generates an upward-sloping supply curve, depicted in Figure 2.
Model 2 concerns with the introduction of the new technology mentioned in Section 2.2. Be-
ginning in 1960, more and more companies switched from the OH to the BOF technology. While
OH still had a signiﬁcant presence in 1965, there is the possibility that the rate of learning would
have shifted signiﬁcantly with an increasing number of ﬁrms adopting the BOF. In response to this
concern, Model 2 is estimated using a restricted sample period of 1955-60. With the exception of
the greater impacts of labor and physical capital on production cost, the result is similar to that
of Model 1, leading us to believe that the technological switch did not confer a signiﬁcant impact
on the learning rate at least until the early 1960s.
Finally Model 3 estimates the static learning model, ignoring the future stream of proﬁts in
(4). This assumes that the discount factor is zero. The learning coeﬃcient has an unexpected
sign, and most of the parameters are imprecisely estimated. Though I am not able to reject the
orthogonality hypothesis, the averaged autocorrelation coeﬃcient in ﬁrm residuals is signiﬁcant
at 0.78, and generates a concern for endogeneity. The result of this static model indicates the
importance of ﬁrms’ forward-looking behavior due to the existence of learning-by-doing.
The estimated costs of Yawata, the largest steel producer, are depicted in Figure 3. The follow-
ing qualitative features are same for other companies. Annualized average costs (AC), marginal
costs (MC), prices, and dynamic marginal costs (DMC) all appear in the ﬁgure, calculated using
the estimates from Model 1. All the data are adjusted by the WPI to constant January 1960
Japanese Yen. The measure, DMCt, is derived from the ﬁrst-order condition (3) discussed in
Section 3.3:















The second equality comes from the Euler equation (4). Both AC and MC were declining
throughout the period because of increasing production experience. The diﬀerence between the
marginal and average costs was determined by the utilization coeﬃcient, λ. Since the cost exhibited
decreasing returns (i.e., λ is estimated to be positive), the values of MC were higher than those of
AC. The gap between MC and DMC indicates the impact of the ﬁrms’ forward-looking behavior:
21the magnitude of the future cost reduction due to a marginal increase in output at time t.T h e
ﬁgure shows that the marginal output increase of 100,000 tons reduced the discount sum of future
costs by 63,400 Yen in 1955. This learning impact decreased over time to 6,400 Yen by the end of
the sample.
The comparison of price and average cost presented in the ﬁgure implies that the steel industry
initially suﬀered losses. The order of Yawata’s loss was 10 million Yen (equivalent to USD 28,000)
in 1955, and Yawata was still unproﬁtable in 1965. If the estimation model and its estimates can
be extended beyond the sample period, Yawata would have reached a break-even point in 1967.
Smaller companies would have taken longer to become proﬁtable, because their average costs did
n o td e c l i n ea sf a s ta sY a w a t a ’ s .
While my revenue ﬁgures are deﬁnitely underestimated, because major steel producers were
multi-product ﬁrms, often selling other steels, such as specialty steels (high-quality steels made out
of crude steel), with relatively high margins, it is known that the business of making ordinary steel
was not proﬁtable. My ﬁnding of steel makers’ ﬁnancial diﬃculty is consistent with our discussion
that the export subsidy was not based on proﬁt-shifting.
Model Predictions To obtain a sense of how the model ﬁts the data, I have compared the actual
and predicted industry outputs and market shares over the study period. The upper half of Table
3 shows the results of this comparison. The left-hand side of the table presents the predictions
based on Model 1, while the right-hand side presents the actual data. To save space, I list only the
market shares of the largest and the smallest ﬁrms (Yawata and Kobe, respectively), but the other
ﬁrms’ market shares show similar results.
How I obtained the predicted values is worth explaining. Using the estimates obtained from
Model 1 shown in Table 2, I compute the current output level using (5) for January 1955. For the
value of a ﬁrm’s future output, I use the ﬁrm’s output lagged one month. Using the actual value of
output does not change the subsequent results much. A unit increase in current output raises the
current cost through the expansion of capacity utilization (because we found that the estimate of λ
is positive), but lowers the future cost through the internal and external learning processes, although
the second learning eﬀect is small. Note that ﬁrms’ current outputs are simultaneously determined
due to the existence of the external learning spillover eﬀect. I accumulated the calculated current
outputs to the pools of experience, zF and zIND, and then used the result of the computation in
22the next period. I repeated the same process for each month until the end of the sample period. I
did not use the estimated supply residual (the estimated value of the left-hand side of (5)), because
otherwise the model will ﬁt the data perfectly.
The results in Table 3 show that the model explains the data well, suggesting that the supply
shock was small. Industry outputs are predicted fairly accurately, if slightly underestimated, while
there is no signiﬁcant bias in the market share prediction. This provides further evidence that
the supply shock may not contain a strong serial correlation after controlling for the time- and
ﬁrm-speciﬁc components.
The bottom half of Table 3 presents the out-of-sample predictions. These were made for the
three years (1966-1968) after the period of estimation. Surprisingly, given the change in steel-
production technology during this period, the model explains the data well even in this three-year
period, and especially well in the case of the market shares.
5 Impact of Subsidy Policy
Do government interventions work well in promoting economic growth? The magnitude of the
contribution of trade policy to economic growth remains an open question. This section provides
an answer to the question for the Japanese steel industry. Based on the model and the estimates
reported in the previous sections, this section measures the impact of an export subsidy on industry
growth by asking what would have happened to the steel market had there been no provision of
such government support. Although a small external learning spillover is found in the estimation,
internal learning was identiﬁed as a signiﬁcant source of productivity in steel production. Therefore
the export subsidy, although it was only 4.5 percent at its maximum, could still in principle have
made a large diﬀerence in the evolution of the Japanese steel industry. The question is how critical
this eﬀect was.
I conducted the following experiment in determining a ﬁrm’s output level, leaving long-run
strategies, such as the level of production capacity, constant. I assumed no subsidy to the steel
industry from 1955 to 1964 (the subsidy was eliminated in1965, as shownin Figure 1) and calculated
new equilibrium ﬁrm outputs for each month. We discussed in Section 3.1 that the subsidy under
study appeared to be exogenous to the promotion of the steel makers, and thus this assumption
should not change the nature of a ﬁrm’s cost function estimated in Section 4. The elimination of the
23subsidy was equivalent to assuming that MRF equals the world export price, Pw (for which we use
a FOB price). I was concerned with the possibility that some ﬁrms would have stopped exporting
in absence of the subsidy. This situation would have occurred in Figure 2 had the no-subsidy MRF
shifted to below G. Appendix B estimates a demand model, and ﬁnds that the ﬁrms in our sample
would have continued to export even in absence of the subsidy.
I am interested in the output level under the no-subsidy scenario. This is equivalent to ﬁnding
the output determined at F in Figure 2 (the intersection between DMCi and MRF∗). The simu-
lation method used here is similar to the procedure used to predict model ﬁtness in the previous
section. I ﬁrst replaced all the MRFsi n( 5 )w i t hMRF∗s (i.e., this is to assume that the subsidy
rate is set at zero). I then used the estimates from Model 1 shown in Table 2 to compute the
current output level using (5) for January 1955. Estimated values were used for the model errors
in the left-hand side of (5). The remaining steps in the simulation method are the same as those
in the method used to calculate the predicted values in the previous section. I ran the model until
the end of 1968, extending the period for three years to see the ensuing impact of the termination
of the subsidy policy.
Figure 4 shows the eﬀect of the subsidy on the industry output level by year. The dotted line
indicates the ratio of the industry output under the subsidy (found in the data) to the simulated
output without subsidy provision. A ratio greater than one indicates that the subsidy had a
positive eﬀect on steel output. A casual inspection of the ﬁgure reveals how small the impact was:
the subsidy stimulated a mere 2 percent increase (maximum) in the industry output’s throughout
the period. The output increase is less than 1 percent when the subsidy of 3 percent was in place
at the beginning of the period, and jumps to 1.7 percent in the year when the subsidy rate rose to
4.5 percent. The subsidy had a large eﬀect in 1960 for two reasons. One is that the highest subsidy
rate of 4.5 percent was in place that year. The other is related to the dynamic behavior of ﬁrms:
facing a substantial drop in the subsidy of more than one percent in the following year, ﬁrms may
have found it more proﬁtable to increase their production levels in 1960 so as to cumulate their
experience. The same economic logic applies to a jump seen in 1963. The impact of the subsidy
tapered oﬀ as the subsidy was phased out toward 1965.
It is interesting to observe that actual outputs grew faster than the outputs predicted under
the scenario, even after the actual subsidy system was terminated. This observation is mainly
generated by the relative amount of ﬁrms’ experience. The output level without the subsidy does
24not exceed the actual output, as Figure 4 indicates. In 1965 the level of actual experience was
a percent higher than that of simulated experience. Thus the internal learning eﬀect may confer
lower marginal costs of production to ﬁrms than are conferred under the simulation. The larger
output gives rise to a higher level of experience, leading actual outputs to grow faster than the
simulated outputs, though the magnitude of the diﬀerence is less than half of one percent.
Why did the export subsidy have such a small eﬀect on output, regardless of our ﬁnding of the
signiﬁcant learning rates? Since a change in the subsidy rate shifts the foreign marginal revenue
curve, MRF, as indicated in Figure 2, the impact of the subsidy policy depends critically on the
slope of the dynamic marginal cost curve at a given point in time. If the dynamic marginal cost,
DMCi, has a steeper gradient, the subsidy induces a lower level of output. I thus calculate the
slope of DMCi using the estimates of Model 1 in Table 2. The dynamic cost slope is found to be
substantial: the average slope is 27,000 (in unit of January 1955 thousand Japanese yen) yen in
the 1950s with an incremental output increase of 100,000 tons of steel. Since the steep dynamic
cost curve did not generate much increase in current output with the subsidy provision, learning
by doing, though it was found to be signiﬁcant, could not help raise future outputs much. This
analysis indicates that the slope of the dynamic marginal cost curve is a key determinant in the
magnitude of the eﬀectiveness of the export subsidy policy.
Figure 4 also shows the impacts of the subsidy under two other counterfactual scenarios. One
scenario assumes a complete knowledge spillover eﬀect found in the thick solid line. This exercise
looks into Spence’s (1984) claim that subsidies are more eﬀective in an industry with a greater
spillover eﬀect. The other simulation is based on the scenario in which MITI doubled the subsidy
rates found in Figure 1 (in the thin solid line). I shall ﬁrst explain the complete spillover results. I
take the estimates of Model 1 in Table 2, and then impose complete spillovers on the model (i.e.,
θ = 1) to simulate the ﬁrm and industry outputs in both the presence and absence of the actual
subsidy structure. Figure 4 shows that the same subsidy level generates a greater impact on the
output level under the case of complete spillover than under the actual case. The subsidy increases
output by as much as 4.1 percent when the spillover is perfect. This ﬁnding conﬁrms that of Spence
(1984), that subsidies are eﬀective in an industry having a greater spillover eﬀect. A subsidy is a
tool that can be used to repair a market failure that hurts ﬁrms’ incentives to produce. The subsidy
eﬀect on output after the policy termination was greater in the complete spillover case than that in
the actual, mainly because of the greater experience achieved under the complete spillover scenario.
25The ﬁnding of a greater policy eﬀect under complete spillovers is consistent with a smaller slope
in the dynamic marginal cost: the slope of the dynamic marginal cost is found to be 7,000 yen in
the 1950s with an incremental output increase of 100,000 tons of steel. The slope under complete
spillover is less than half of that calculated from the Model 1 estimates.
Structural estimation allows us to simulate the eﬀects of diﬀerent subsidy rates from the actual.
While the actual subsidy rates were modest, it would be interesting to see the impacts of more
aggressive export push policies. I simulated the magnitude of the policy eﬀect under the assumption
that MITI doubled the export subsidy for steel. This scenario makes the subsidy rate 6 percent
from 1953 to 1956, and 9 percent from 1958 to 1960. The estimates in Table 2 are used for this
exercise. The result is represented by the thin solid line shown in Figure 4. To obtain the result,
I ﬁrst calculated the simulated output level with no subsidy, and then predicted the output level
under the doubled subsidy rates. Figure 4 shows that the increase in output under the doubled
subsidy would not have been twice as much as that shown by the dotted line: there are decreasing
returns depending on scale in the provision of subsidy, so much so that the policy eﬀect would have
been generally lower than the complete spillover case under the actual subsidy rates.
The ﬁnding that the subsidy had only small impacts on output conﬁrms the general skepticism
expressed by several economists as to the eﬀectiveness of industrial policy. Commenting on the
Japanese industrial trade policy, Patrick and Rosovsky (1976) wrote: “Our view is that, while the
government has certainly provided a favorable environment, the main impetus to growth has been
private. Government intervention generally has tended (and intended) to accelerate trends already
put in motion by private market forces” (p. 47).
6C o n c l u s i o n
An important issue in analyzing international trade, economic growth, and development is the
contribution of government policies to economic growth. While import-substitution policies lost
their appeal in the 1980s, there has been a shift in favor of export-promotion policies. Although
direct export subsidies are prohibited for industrial products under GATT Article XVI, exceptions
for “primary” products have received considerable attentions (Jackson, 2000). The World Bank
study (1993) documents the fact that many high-performing Asian economies adopted both explicit
and implicit forms of export subsidies. These policies are sometimes seen by many developing
26countries as eﬀective strategies for development.
This paper explored the Japanese steel industry in the 1950s and 1960s to evaluate the eﬀec-
tiveness of export subsidies at stimulating steel production. Learning by doing was an essential
feature of the steel-production process. Using a dynamic estimation model, this paper identiﬁed a
signiﬁcant learning rate of above 20 percent during the study period. It also found little evidence
of intra-industry knowledge spillover. The paper found that the slope of the dynamic marginal cost
curve is a key determinant of the degree of eﬀectiveness of export subsidies.
The simulation results indicated that, despite of a signiﬁcant learning rate, the Japanese subsidy
policy had only a negligible impact on industry growth. The engine of the Japanese steel miracle was
autonomously driven by market mechanisms. This ﬁnding implied that the policy did not contribute
much to Japanese economic growth as a whole. A back-of-the-envelope calculation indicates that
the government subsidy expenditure in the period of 1955-64 amounted to approximately 22 billion
yen, or USD 61 million (in 1960 prices without discounting. The actual exchange rate was ﬁxed at
360 yen per U.S. dollar during the period). MITI could have subsidized other sectors that would
have generated higher returns to society with the same resources. In fact, from the welfare point of
view, there was little rationale for the export subsidy of the Japanese steel industry of the period;
in a competitive world environment, an export subsidy is dominated by a production subsidy if
learning by doing has externalities. With the evidence of few spillovers of learning, however, no
subsidy is ﬁrst best. The provision of an export subsidy distorts production and consumption
decisions, leading to deadweight losses. Furthermore, general equilibrium analysis implies that,
although exports and imports are both increased by an export subsidy, welfare is less with the
subsidy than under free trade; welfare may sometimes be even worse than under autarky.
The ﬁnding of the slight policy eﬀect is consistent with the ﬁndings in Beason and Weinstein
(1996), the ﬁrst systematic analysis of the eﬀect of Japanese industry targeting. Based on data
in thirteen single-digit industries and ﬁve policy instruments (loans, subsidies, tariﬀs, quotas, and
taxes), their careful reduced-form estimation results indicate that the change in total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) in targeted industries diﬀers little from the TFP change in non-targeted industries.
The cross-industry studies, however, have a common weakness, in that it is often diﬃcult fully
to control unobserved industry diﬀerences: diﬀerent industries have diﬀerent market structures,
and therefore diﬀerent economic mechanisms which translate subsidy policy into industry growth.
In contrast to their cross-industry study, this paper used the Japanese steel experience to model
27explicitly the transmission mechanism of the policy eﬀect on the industry growth. The use of a
structural estimation method allowed for direct assessment of the policy impact by performing a
simulation exercise. Though the methodologies were diﬀerent, this paper found evidence that is
consistent with Beason and Weinstein (1996).
It is important to be cautious in drawing general conclusions from this study of the global eﬀec-
tiveness of using trade policies to stimulate economic growth. The small open economy assumption
employed in the paper plays a critical role in ensuring that there are no terms of trade eﬀects of
the export subsidy. This assumption thus generates the result that an input tariﬀ merely alters the
allocation of domestically produced steel between domestic and foreign shipments. Although the
assumption describes well the situation surrounding the Japanese steel industry in the 1950s and
1960s, studies of other industries may require a diﬀerent analytical framework in order to evaluate
the eﬀectiveness of trade policies in promoting growth.
A Data Source 18
Monthly data on the industry output and shipment, and the annual ﬁrm-level output data were
obtained from Japan Iron and Steel Federation (1955-1970a). Since monthly ﬁrm output data were
not available, I constructed monthly data under the assumption that a ﬁrm’s production share did
not change throughout the year. This assumption was perhaps not far from the reality, because
the ﬁrm production share remained fairly stable over the sample period (see Table 3). The ﬁrm
(industry) cumulative output at time t (zFi,t (zINDt)) are calculated starting from 1947.
The monthly price data for domestically produced steel were taken directly from companies’
semi-annual ﬁnancial reports, 1955-1969. Eight steel types are typically considered as belonging
to the category of ordinary steel, including bars, shaped steels, rails, plates, rolled sheets, wires,
tin plates, and electrometallurgical products. Using sales shares, I calculated a weighted average
of these steel prices for each company. I found that the calculated price level does not vary much
across ﬁrms, and hence Yawata’s ordinary steel price was used for estimation. This price was
adjusted by the manufactured goods WPI to constant January 1960 Japanese Yen.
Two monthly input prices were used in the paper: the data on iron ore were taken from the
Bank of Japan, 1955-1969, while the average wage data for the six integrated steel ﬁrms under
18I am grateful to Tsuyoshi Nakamura for making the data available to me.
28study came from Japan Iron and Steel Federation (1955-1970b).
The source of steel trade data was Japan Iron andSteel Federation (1955-1970b), which provided
the monthly data on steel exports and imports, the CIF and FOB prices of ordinary steel, and the
historical export subsidy and import tariﬀ rates.
The data on production capacity came from companies’ semi-annual ﬁnancial reports, which
adopted a complicated conversion method endorsed by the Japanese Steel Association to calculate
the capacity. The utilization rate in the data was thus standardized across ﬁrms, but did not reﬂect
the actual level of operational utilization in an economics sense. Japanese Iron and Steel Federation
(1955-1970b) was used to identify the months elapsed after the blast furnace was installed in each
plant by ﬁrm.
BS t e e l D e m a n d
This subsection describes a demand model for Japanese steel. As explained in Section 3.1, demand
estimation is necessary to check whether, as a counterfactual scenario, a ﬁrm would have ceased to
export in the absence of the export subsidies.
The Second World War destroyed 25 percent of Japan’s national wealth and assets, 25 percent
of its physical structures, and 82 percent of its ships. The steel industry lost its most reliable
customer, the military, and civilian enterprises provided little demand for steel. Steel demand
emerged again when the Korean War generated a surge in orders for Japanese goods in 1952.
A wide variety of industries consume steel, ranging from automobile production to construction
and shipbuilding. There was little demand for imported steel: imports accounted for under 2
percent of domestic steel demand, with the exception of early 1957 when the demand for imports
increased to 10 percent of domestic demand due to the temporary lifting of the import tariﬀ on
steel. In the sample period of the late 1950s and early 1960s, no particular changes were observed
in domestic steel demand: the steel consumption shares among the various steel-consuming sectors
(shipbuilding, automobile, industrial machinery, electric machinery, and construction) remained
fairly stable, and public expenditures on steel change little.
We allowed for diﬀerentiation between domestically produced steel and imported steel. The











+  d,t. (6)
This demand function is derived from a standard CES utility function. Let P and Q be price
and quantity. The subscripts, D and I, stand for domestic and imported steels, respectively (time
subscripts are omitted). The demand error is represented by  d. A constant and trend terms are
included in αd. I also included quarterly dummies, and a dummy for the year of 1957, because this is
the year when the tariﬀ was lifted temporarily, presumably because of a surge in domestic demand.
The coeﬃcient βd measures the elasticity of substitutability between domestic and imported steels
perceived in the market. Theory suggests that βd should be greater than one (otherwise, marginal
revenue is negative; see Helpman and Krugman, 1985) The two-stage least-squared method (2SLS)
was used to estimate this demand model. I used, as instruments, input prices (for iron ore and
labor) for the steel industry and the average industry capacity, for cost shifters. These instruments
are likely to correlate with the price ratio in the explanatory variables, but not correlate with  d.
Table A presents two demand results: one from the ordinary least squared (OLS) estimation, and
the other from 2SLS. The OLS result is presented for the purpose of comparison. Serial correlation
is often found with time series data. Regression of residuals from each estimation method ﬁnds
a signiﬁcant AR (1) coeﬃcient of 0.4. The table thus reports the results from quasi-diﬀerenced
regressions. It makes sense that the 2SLS estimates have larger standard errors. For the 2SLS
estimation, the J statistics would not reject the hypothesis that the instruments are orthogonal to
the error term. Table A also shows averaged ﬁrst-stage F-statistics for the explanatory power of the
instruments, conditional on the included exogenous variables. They suggest that the instruments
are not weak.
We are interested in the estimate of the elasticity of substitution, βd. The OLS estimate violates
the theoretical constraint that βd ≥ 1, while the 2SLS estimate generates a reasonable magnitude
for the substitution. The comparison stresses the importance of controlling for endogeneity of price.
Based on the demand estimates, we analyzed a ﬁrm’s decision to export in the absence of export
subsidies. Figure 2 indicates that a ﬁrm does not export if MRF∗ is located below G.I nS e c t i o n
3.3 I discussed that the steel makers competed one another over the choice of output. Under the
Cournot assumption, MRHi is written as






The inverse demand, PD (QD,Q I), is derived from a standard CES utility function. Firm i’s
domestic unit sale is Qi,D. One way to ﬁnd a ﬁrm’s export decision in the absence of the subsidy is
to (i) calculate a value of MRHi at the counterfactual output level obtained in Section 5 (denote
this value MRH∗
i ) ,a n dt h e n( i i )c o m p a r et h eMRH∗
i with MRF∗. As discussed in footnote 11,
however, we do not have data on Qi,D. Using the theoretical implication discussed in the footnote,
we assume that all six ﬁrms had an equal share of the domestic market, and use the industry’s
domestic shipment data to derive Qi,D. The six steel ﬁrms in the sample supplied on average
71% of the market for domestically produced steel from 1955 to 1965. I found that the averaged
MRH∗
i (41.75) is lower than the averaged MRF∗ (49.02). The values in parentheses are in units of
thousands of yen at the January 1960 price. I thus conclude that all the ﬁrms in the sample would
have continued exporting. This result is not surprising in hindsight, based on the slight policy
impact reported in Section 5.
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34TABLE 1
DEFINITIONS AND SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
JAPANESE STEEL IN 1955-65
Variables Descriptions Mean Std. Error Min Max
P Domestically produced steel price in the domestic market [thousand yen in the Jan 1960 price] 53.3 5.1 43.8 69.0
MRF Exported steel price (=FOB*(1+export subsidy rate)) [thousand yen in the Jan 1960 price] 50.6 6.1 41.5 68.4
PI Imported steel price (=CIF*(1+import tariff))  [thousand yen in the Jan 1960 price] 60.5 22.4 23.0 193.9
QD The amount of monthly domestic steel shipment (exclusive of export)    [million tons] 1.1 0.5 0.3 2.0
QI The amount of steel imported per month  [million tons] 0.017 0.025 0.0007 0.124
Ore Price of iron ore  [thousand yen in the Jan 1960 price] 10.7 1.2 9.3 14.1
Labor Monthly average wage paid by the six steel makers [thousand Yen in the Jan 1960 price] 34.5 8.3 22.2 50.5
U Capacity utilization rate (%) 94.1 20.3 50.5 203.8
K Physical capital  [million tons] 4.6 4.2 0.4 21.4
Age Age of blast furnace facility, weighted by the capacity size by plant  [years] 16.6 8.0 1.6 32.9
zFi Cumulative sum of firm i's output up to the previous month  [million tons] 15.2 12.5 1.7 62.3
zIND Cumulative sum of the industry output up to the previous month  [million tons] 128.5 71.9 37.5 286.3
qi Monthly steel production by firm [thousand tons] 22.1 15.5 2.82 69.4
Sample size: 774TABLE 2
COST ESTIMATION RESULTS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Base Period of 1955-60 Static
Est. Std. Est. Std. Est. Std.
Constant 4.57 ** 0.64 6.79 ** 1.00 0.17 0.15
Labor -0.005 0.02 0.05 ** 0.03 0.19 * 0.12
Ore -0.24 ** 0.04 -0.22 ** 0.03 -0.31 ** 0.08
Utilization 0.10 ** 0.04 0.08 ** 0.03 0.12 0.07
Capital 0.008 0.01 0.14 ** 0.01 -0.01 0.04
Experience -0.39 ** 0.03 -0.39 ** 0.03 0.18 0.15
Spillover 0.01 ** 0.004 0.01 ** 0.005 1.00 1.106
J-statistics (D.F) 1.68  (5) 1.13  (5) 0.26  (5)
Coefficient of AR (1) 0.06 0.001 0.78 **
Learning Rates 0.24 ** 0.24 ** -0.13
The number of observations = 774.
* Significance at the 90-percent confidence level.
** Significance at the 95-percent confidence level.
Notes:
The firm and year fixed components are included in the estimations (not reported).
J statistics provide a test of overidentifications. A coefficient of AR(1) is constructed by first obtaining an estimated
coefficient of the lagged residual for each firm, and taking an average of them. The learning rate is the 
magnitude of the cost drop with doubling the experience. It is obtained as 1 minus 2 to the power of the experience coefficient.TABLE 3
MODEL PREDICTIONS
Estimated Actual 
Industry Largest firm's Smallest Firm's Industry Largest firm's Smallest Firm's
Outputs (M tons) (Yawata) Share (%) (Kobe) Share (%) Outputs (M tons) (Yawata) Share (%) (Kobe) Share (%)
1955 9.38 24.45 4.15 9.41 24.48 4.14
1956 11.05 23.13 4.04 11.11 23.18 4.04
1957 12.51 22.83 4.22 12.57 22.92 4.20
1958 12.03 23.59 4.15 12.12 23.74 4.14
1959 16.52 23.70 4.30 16.63 23.81 4.30
1960 21.93 22.59 4.37 22.14 22.78 4.38
1961 27.97 21.47 4.25 28.27 21.65 4.23
1962 27.48 20.78 4.44 27.55 20.85 4.43
1963 31.26 19.46 4.58 31.50 19.56 4.59
1964 39.31 18.98 4.33 39.80 19.14 4.34
1965 41.14 18.81 5.50 41.16 18.85 5.49
Outside-of-the-Sample Predictions
Estimated Actual 
Industry Largest firm's Smallest Firm's Industry Largest firm's Smallest Firm's
Outputs (M tons) (Yawata) Share (%) (Kobe) Share (%) Outputs (M tons) (Yawata) Share (%) (Kobe) Share (%)
1966 47.73 18.78 5.58 47.78 18.78 5.58
1967 61.96 18.65 5.41 62.15 18.67 5.41
1968 66.78 18.57 5.41 66.89 18.55 5.42
Note: For the sake of brevity, I only report market shares of the largest and smallest firms. The largest steel maker in 1955-68 was 
Yawata, and the smallest was Kobe. Market shares prediction of the other firms show similar degree of accuracy.TABLE A
DEMAND ESTIMATION RESULTS
with AR (1) Error Correction
OLS 2SLS
Est. Std. Err. Est. Std. Err.
Constant 0.84 ** 0.11 3.11 ** 0.33
Log of (PD/PI) 0.26 ** 0.03 4.46 ** 1.50
Trend 0.06 ** 0.01 0.24 1.12
Dummy on Year 57 -0.46 ** 0.09 -1.18 0.94
Dummy on Q2 0.08 0.06 0.38 1.15
Dummy on Q3 0.20 ** 0.06 0.83 1.24
Dummy on Q4 0.04 0.06 0.01 1.08
AR 1 coefficients 0.386 0.388
R-squared 0.50 -
J-statistics (D.F) - 0.60  (2)
1st-stage F-statistics - 15.96 **
No. obs. 132 132
** Significance at the 95-percent confidence level.
Notes:
Equation (6) in Appendix B is estimated. The dependent variable is the logarithm of a quantity ratio; 
quantity of domestic steel, divided by import quantity. Estimates are based on a regression from quasi-
differenced variables.  J statistic provides a test of overidentifying restrictions. First-stage F statistic 
provides the average explanatory power of the instruments, conditional on the included exogenous variables. FIGURE 1
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